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how typical applications of game theory to describe first mover advantage in the context of 
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incommensurable qualities and quantities.  We then review the work of Porter (1996) and others 
with respect to sustainable competitive advantage and suggest that the Nash equilibrium may 
provide some guidance as to the kinds of circumstances in which a profitable first mover 
advantage may or may not be obtainable when entering international markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Professor of International Business Strategy, Southern New Hampshire University 
† Professor of International Marketing, Southern New Hampshire University 
‡ C.E.O., Computer Futures and sometime professor of mathematics, Woodbury University 
§ Assistant Professor of Accounting, Southern New Hampshire University 
 
2 
 
Imitating the Japanese, Total Quality, Cross-Group Subsidization, and Market Flooding: 
 
 In describing the success of Japanese corporations, many authors invoke market leaders, such 
as SONY (Suarez and Lanzolla, 2001; Eisenmann, 2003).  SONY is probably a poor choice 
because even in his early criticism of Japanese firms whose only strategy was quality control and 
who ultimately found themselves engaged in destructive competition, Porter (1996) argues that 
the problem with Japanese firms lay not with leaders in innovation like SONY, but rather with 
the average Japanese firm which was content to duplicate its rivals’ plant layouts, manufacturing 
processes, value chain and market entry approaches.  However, even with market leaders, 
excessive competition can provoke unintended market consequences particularly if a market is 
the type where early market entry may lead to occupying the entire market niche (Modis, 1998).  
As Eisenmann (2003) remarks: 
“…The stakes can be enormous when firms race to acquire customers: if 
winners take most, little is left for losers.  In extreme cases, racing can 
yield disastrous results for all parties.  This was true for many industries in 
which firms pursued learning curve strategies.  After cutting prices, these 
firms found it difficult to gain sustainable cost advantages.  Often they 
were unable to keep their learning proprietary due to technological 
spillovers: competitors copied their new and improved techniques.” 
 
 Eisenmann treats this problem in typical economic fashion, describing customer acquisition 
as a convex curve with characteristics similar to those of classical pollution abatement problems 
(see Figure 1).  However, there are additional considerations, largely those developed by Porter 
which indicate in at least a graphical sense the different elements required for sustainable 
advantage (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
 Eisenmann is not insensitive to Porter’s analysis, and his approach is to catalogue the 
standard requirements for competitive advantage as factors which increase customer acquisition 
cost.  He see’s the main pitfall of the customer race, or the race for first mover advantage to arise 
from attempts to broaden a company’s products beyond the core demand characteristics of the 
bundle of goods and services most likely to appeal to its customers.  Understanding the structure 
of these bundles is not prima facie terribly difficult.  In Figure 2 we have developed a simplified 
chart designed to express the tradeoffs between price and quality that Porter explores more fully 
in his cost-focus matrix. Porter’s more complex underlying argument however, is that in the 
long-run for a firm’s competitive strategy to succeed it must achieve above average profitability.  
 
3 
 
In order to do this, the firm requires a more complex competitive strategy, based on a more 
nuanced set of tradeoffs between cost and focus (as shown in Figure 3.) 
 
Globalization and Strategic Planning: The Example of Japan 
 Globalization adds a particularly difficult and complex dimension to strategic planning, 
despite the conventional wisdom that geographical diversification is less problematic than 
product portfolio diversification.  Both Porter and the Wharton School’s Mauro Guillen have 
provided considerable commentary which runs counter to this conventional wisdom, even though 
Porter has been frequently interpreted as supporting the conventional wisdom.  For example, in 
looking at Japan’s approach to the globalization of markets, in 2003 (Fellman, Takei and 
Wright), we undertook a very specific analysis of Japan’s position with respect to the 
globalization of information and financial markets. We drew a great deal of inspiration for our 
approach from the work of Guillen, in particular, his prize winning paper, “Business Groups in 
Emerging Economies: A Resource Based View” and his subsequent book, The Limits of 
Convergence.   
 Like Guillen, and legal scholar Amir Licht (2001, 1998) we felt that globalization was and 
remains an extremely complex process, which is neither static nor yet fully understood.  In 
particular, we felt that the unique cultural and economic history of Japan required a specialized 
approach and that globalization processes were often more likely to require Japanese business 
groups to retain or accentuate their “Japaneseness” in order to remain competitive in the evolving 
global economy.  Guillen phrases this approach nicely when he argues in the opening of his 
book: 
Conventional wisdom has it that the world is undergoing rapid 
globalization and that this process compels countries, industries, and firms 
to converge toward a homogeneous organizational pattern of “best 
practice” or “optimal efficiency”.  Those who fail to conform are doomed 
to fail in the global economy. I argue against this modernist, flat-earth 
view of globalization. Countries and organizations do not gravitate toward 
a supposedly universal model of economic success and organizational 
form as they attempt to cope with globalization. Rather, the mutual 
awareness that globalization entails invites them to be different, namely, to 
use their unique economic, political, and social advantages as leverage in 
the global marketplace.  
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 In taking a quantitative approach to Guillen’s argument, we used W. Brian Arthur’s 
economics of increasing returns to look very specifically at technology subsidization (including 
the kind of “cross-subsidization” so heavily emphasized as the foundation of sustainable 
competitive advantage by Michael Porter). However, there is a particular importance in 
introducing the economics of increasing returns in the context of both globalization and Japanese 
corporate and financial governance.  The quantitative point here is that while the statistical and 
game theoretic approaches used by Aoki, Kotaro and other REITI researchers often relies on a 
Nash equilibrium solution, that solution depends in most cases upon “closed” economic solutions 
of the form best characterized by decreasing marginal returns.  The Arthur approach allows us to 
introduce network externalities, “open” systems and non-equilibrium dynamics, all features 
which we believe are particularly characteristic of the global information revolution (see also 
Katz, Shy, Shapiro and Varian, etc.)   
 In our 2003 article we then developed a more comprehensive treatment of technology 
diffusion and technology replaced based around the simulations developed by Paul Windrum of 
the University of Maastricht and Chris Birchenhall of the University of Birmingham (Windrum 
and Birchenhall, 2001).  In subsequent years, we have been coding, developing and testing our 
own model of technology substitution (Fellman, Groothuis, and Mertz, 2006; Mertz, Groothuis 
and Fellman, 2006).  One of the results of this model is to provide a quantitative explanation of 
the kinds of market collapse which result from the combination of an excessively intense race for 
first mover advantage combined with technology shocks, particularly in high-technology 
markets, where product life cycles tend to be considerably more brief than in other consumer 
segments. 
 Ultimately, both in our own simulation and in the Windrum-Birchen hall simulation we 
found two very interesting results which equilibrium economic models, including the kind of 
model used by Eisenmann to treat the costs of customer acquisition in a first mover advantage 
race, might not capture well, if at all.  In one case a new technology replaced an old technology 
and the user base was also replaced with new users.  This is a fairly well known phenomenon 
and is typical for markets like those for microprocessors where a new technology entirely 
outmodes the existing technology.  In Japan, this kind of technology succession has given rise to 
some very interesting features on the geographical landscape, ceteris paribus the “stickiness” of 
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Japanese capital investment, perhaps among the most notable being the Gomi-no-shima landfill 
in Tokyo bay. 
 The second interesting result occurred where a new technology replaced older technology, 
but the new technology went to a new user base, while a proportion of the older technology 
remained with the existing user base.  A typical example of this kind of technology substitution 
is frequently observed with banking and medical records keeping where the sunk costs of 
operational management are often perceived to outweigh the improvements offered by the new 
technology.  Globally, this is seen where many Latin American banks still use Wang computer 
technology even though the pricing of more modern hardware and software is clearly not 
prohibitive.  In advanced industrial countries, such as the United States, the phenomena is seen 
(Evans and Wurster, 1997) in medical record-keeping where data processing (through 
incompatible modes and legacy systems) is believed to account for approximately one-third of 
all medical costs. 
 This second kind of distribution is, not unexpectedly, mathematically more “lumpy” or 
unpredictable (and often, in the case of technologies like software, heteroskedastic and generally 
ill-behaved) and, hence more difficult to deal with from the standpoint of strategy and planning.  
The principal contribution of agent-based modeling in this regard has been to recognize that with 
new technologies, that first mover advantages may play a crucial role (Arthur, 1994).  However, 
these advantages are often “emergent” in nature and not discernible below a certain threshold of 
market penetration (Modis, 1998). As frustrating as this inherently complex model may be at 
times, it does offer some suggestions to strategic planners.  In this case, Porter’s (1996) maxim 
that strategic planning needs a time horizon of at least a decade (a recommendation which is 
highly consonant with Japanese business practice and policy and which is an avenue of 
differentiation which has historically led to competitive advantage for Japanese business groups 
competing internationally) is borne out both by the Windrum Birchenhall technology 
replacement model as well as the combinatorial market landscape approach which we have used 
in the Southern New Hampshire University International Business Modeling Laboratory 
simulation.  Both models suggest that markets and consumers need to be “tolerant” of new 
product entrants or new product categories if they expect to raise overall economic welfare (or in 
Porter’s favored language, firm profitability, the hardest of all the economic variables to 
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maximize), particularly if the expected mechanism of national prosperity is characterized as a 
punctuated equilibrium Aoki, (1997, 1998). 
 Curiously enough, this result has a bit of the flavor of the Chicago School of Economics’ in 
their treatment of consumption and production.  We found this a bit surprising insofar as our 
simulation in particular was aimed at modeling and understanding producer dynamics (following 
the Chalmers Johnson maxim that consumption is not difficult to organize, but rather that it is 
production especially national production which is difficult to organize).  At present, this result 
seems to be attributable to what chaos and complexity theory characterizes as local rules of 
behavior.  In part, this may result from the way in which we have coded our VenSim® 
simulation, but it coincides well with empirical data from Porter, Hovhanissian (2002), and 
others who argue that value clusters are built from the ground up, often using local rules of 
behavior (Holland, 1995, Kauffman 1995, Aoki, 1995B).  Regardless of the underlying 
mechanism, however, the implications for strategic planning and forecasting are clear that 
structures which favor flexibility and longer time-scales are likely to represent a competitive 
advantage and these are particularly Japanese characteristics (“Ieyasu was patient”). 
 
More on the Complex Dynamics of Globalization 
 
 To this point we have reviewed approximately a half a dozen journal articles and some dozen 
odd conference papers by our own group and several times that amount of work by others on 
economic and computational simulation, Japanese corporate governance and the applications of 
agent-based modeling, chaos and complexity theory to business strategy.  To have merely done 
this in order to state that “Michael Porter was right after all” would have been a rather trivial 
exercise.  More importantly, we stand by our own earlier work and the fine work of Mauro 
Guillen, Amir Licht, Karl Kester and others on the difficult and complex nature of globalization 
and the generally overly simplistic, culturally shallow and mathematically weak arguments 
which have been put forth by a variety of authors on the topic of “global convergence”.    
 As Johnson noted in his famous article “Japan: The Venice of the East”, one area of trade 
where Japan has consistently excelled, and has excelled as the result of being able to take 
advantage of unique cultural and historical factors has been in cross-firm and cross-group market 
entry and early dominance of brand loyalty and market share.  In the final text section of our 
article, we will apply a series of insights initially developed by Paul Hofer and Sir Partha 
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Dasgupta on what first-mover advantage actually means and how a proper understanding of 
Nash equilibrium can allow a firm to determine where and whether an actual first or second 
mover advantage exists and if so, where it is located. 
 
What Determines A First Mover Advantage? 
 
 The competitive concept of the first mover advantage is easy to state in layman’s terms.  
Simply put, a firm or a product is perceived to have a first mover advantage when the first firm 
to enter the market, or in some cases, to create the market, gets an overwhelming advantage, 
either filling the entire market niche or getting a lead of such great magnitude that competitors 
can never catch up (Modis, 1998).  In contradistinction, a second mover advantage generally 
arises when a first mover incurs all of the costs of early market entry without being able to reap 
the benefits, whether due to changes in technology, markets, politics or other unforeseen factors.  
The experience of Pepsi-cola in India and the U.S.S.R. are both good examples of a firm that 
planned to capitalize on a first mover advantage and instead opened the door for its competitor, 
Coca Cola, to reap an almost overwhelming second mover advantage.  However when we 
attempt to move from an anecdotal or purely conceptual description of first and second mover 
advantage to a more mathematically rigorous formulation of these concepts, particularly if we do 
so in game-theoretic terms, the exercise suddenly becomes dauntingly difficult and precision 
seems to slip away the harder one tries to define it. 
 To help unravel the complexities surrounding this topic we will turn to a rather interesting 
explanation by game theorist Paul Hofer (Hofer, 1998), taken in part from Cambridge University 
lectures by Professor Partha Dasgupta (see also Dasgupta, 2005).   We provide a close reading of 
Hofer here because we feel the importance of his work demands more than a brief summary or 
even a modest synthesis.  Hofer first provides an example of a game in normal form with an 
independent Nash equilibrium (shown in figure 4).  He then modifies the payoff matrices as 
shown below, giving the advantage to whoever moves first, thus forcing the expansion of the 
game from normal form, where all the moves may be played simultaneously to the extensive 
form, where strategies are executed and outcomes are reaped sequentially (as shown in Figure 5).  
Hofer’s next step is then to modify the payoff at the extreme lower right from 4;2 to 4;10.  This 
modification produces a new structure which contains not one but two Nash equilibria.  What is 
important here is that the sequential nature of the game, something which all students of 
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international trade and negotiations are familiar with, allows the player who moves to determine 
which of the two Nash equilibria the game actually arrives at.  In being able to force a Nash 
equilibrium from one of multiple outcomes, by an early mover choice, we now have a genuine  
first mover advantage.**
 In comparison to this example, Hofer argues that the traditional approach to 
understanding the second mover advantage has generally been fallacious.  Some of this is 
just a poor choice of language, or poor mathematical understanding, but the deeper point 
to be made here is that a proper understanding of the application of the Nash equilibrium 
can then replace these questionable examples with a new category of properly defined 
second mover advantage.  Naturally, this issue should be of considerable interest for 
those involved in strategic planning, particularly when planning whether or not to be the 
first entrant in a new, foreign market, a strategy which has often been central to the 
historical success of Japanese business groups. 
   
 
The Traditional View of Second Mover Advantage 
 
 Hofer’s example of the conventional treatment of second mover advantage uses as the setting 
of the industrial revolution with England being the first mover and Continental Europe being the 
second mover, a type of explanation familiar to students of political economy (shown in normal 
form in figure 6).  Coincidentally, this also happens to be the kind of over-generalized approach 
of which Mauro Guillen is so rightfully critical in his analysis of the literature on globalization.  
Hofer then points out that if one examines this game carefully, its form is not different from that 
of game 1.  What is perhaps more significant is that upon close inspection, there is no way to 
change these payoffs.  Whether Britain industrializes first or second, the payoff remains the 
same, i.e., 20 for England and 45 for Europe, (shown in extensive form in figure 7). 
  This means that there is, at least in a scientific or mathematical sense, no meaningful way in 
which one can define the so-called “second mover advantage”.  The payoff for industrializing is 
simply higher for the second player. Choice, however, the sine qua non of strategic planning, is 
                                                 
** Those readers who are interested in the architecture of games with multiple Nash equilibria 
and the recent discoveries of both new Nash equilibria in games previously thought to be solved 
as well as new kinds of Nash equilibria may wish to read Fellman (2004) or Fellman and Post 
(2006) at http://www.ArXiv.org 
 
9 
 
simply not involved!   This means that such characterizations of second mover advantage cannot 
be measured, nor can they provide meaningful decision heuristics for strategic planners.  They 
are, at best, academic fictions, and at worst, crackpot misrepresentations of game-theoretic 
metaphors which confuse and confound serious strategic issues. 
 An even worse consequence of this choice of game metaphor is the fact that if one tries to 
change the sequence of moves, then the outcome must change as must the equilibrium payoffs.  
This leads to what Hofer characterizes as “surprising, but irrefutable results”.  Because this kind 
of game has only a single Nash Equilibrium, the payoff remains at 20 for England and 45 for 
Europe no matter who moves first.  Thus, mathematically speaking, it is essentially nonsense to 
speak of a second mover in this context.  If one attempts to get around this difficulty by 
incorporating other factors, such as a postulated learning curve effect, then one can get different 
numbers, but the different payoffs then generated mean that one is now comparing different 
games, which is an incommensurability even worse than the initial case.  The best such an 
approach can do is lead to a “fortuitous mistake”.  In more ordinary terms it means that this type 
of analysis will provide a false rationale and lead to false or unsupported strategic conclusions. 
 
A New View of the Second Mover Advantage 
 
 Fortunately, this is not the end of Hofer’s analysis.  Behind this analysis lies the discovery of 
a different kind of second mover advantage, what we might be tempted to call a “real second 
mover advantage”.  This kind of  second-mover advantage is one which is properly stated, and as 
a result is then defined by its Nash Equilibrium characteristics (no Nash equilibrium, but a 
solvable game via backward induction so long as the sequence of moves for each player is 
known).  The example which Hofer uses is one where competing firms must decide whether to 
use common or proprietary technologies.  This is the kind of issue which has played a strong role 
in the development of modern, information age technologies (Evans and Wurster, 1997; 
Windrum and Birchenhall, 2001).  It is also an issue which has had a profound role in Japanese 
industrial policy (Johnson, 1983, 1995; Aoki, 2001) and in many situations has been driven by 
the traditional three-pronged Japanese approach of licensing, indigenization/diffusion and 
administrative guidance (although the latter has in part been translated from MEITI to Keidanren 
or the Bank of Japan in some circumstances). Hofer’s example proceeds as follows: 
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(Suppose) there are two firms, call them Piccolo and Gigantic. They both 
produce similar products; however, Piccolo has only a small market 
share, while Gigantic controls a large proportion of the market. Both 
firms want to bring a new product onto the market, for which they must 
introduce one of two systems. But Gigantic has rather inferior technology 
compared to Piccolo. If both firms operate with the same system, then the 
whole market is in that very system, and can choose between the two 
technologies. It will presumably favour Piccolo. On the other hand, if the 
two firms operate different systems, Gigantic's customers are stuck with 
Gigantic's system and hence have no access to Piccolo's advanced 
technology, which hence can only be sold to Piccolo's market share.  
 
 According to this rationale the payoffs in are set as shown in Figure 8.  Hofer then explains 
that even in the absence of a Nash Equilibrium, as long as the sequence of moves is know, we 
can calculate the outcome.  If Piccolo moves first, they will choose System A, to which Gigantic 
will respond by choosing system B.  If Gigantic moves first, they will choose System B, which 
will also be chosen by Piccolo.  What is, perhaps, most interesting here is that both players do 
better (i.e., enjoy a second-mover advantage, or a higher payoff) when they go second.  Unlike 
the counter-factual hypothetical explanation advanced for industrialization, this type of setting 
possesses a real second mover advantage, precisely because the second mover enjoys a higher 
payoff than if they had moved first.  This is a model of second mover advantage which can be 
measured and directly applied to strategic planning decisions, particularly those regarding first or 
second mover strategies for foreign market entry. 
 
Real First and Second Mover Advantages – Some Identifying Characteristics 
 
 Hofer uses a simple game of “musical chairs” in the Princeton University dining hall to 
illustrate how one can achieve an optimal payoff by moving second (Hofer, 1998).  In the more 
complex setting of international business, anticipating one’s rival is often a function of 
possessing accurate information.  In this context, disinformation may well be one of the most 
powerful tools available for developing competitive strategies where a real second mover 
advantage is involved.  Here, the principal identifier for the second mover advantage is being 
able to calculate the absence of a Nash equilibrium.  However, there is also a second identifier 
which can easily be observed, and that is the presence of mixed strategies.  If a competitive 
dynamic possesses mixed strategies, then the game will have at least one Nash Equilibrium.  
This is a direct consequence of Nash’s proof where the correspondence of mixed and pure 
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strategies define the combinatorics of his argument (Nash, 1950, pp. 2-3).   This leads us to two 
important conclusions.  If we are attempting to formally define a true second mover advantage, 
then we can immediately rule out any strategic situation with mixed strategies.  To satisfy the 
conditions of a genuine second mover advantage, there must be no Nash Equilibrium, which 
necessarily means no mixed strategies. 
 For first mover advantage, exactly the opposite situation obtains.  We should be looking for 
the Nash Equilibria, and we should expect to find mixed strategies.  From the standpoint of 
competitive strategy a company or group may quite possibly find it highly rewarding to inject a 
deliberate element of disinformation into the marketplace simply to make conditions more 
difficult for rivals attempting to determine the group’s strategy (Egnor 1999; Billings, 1999; 
Sato, Akiyama and Farmer, 2002).  This finding provides an interesting kind of negative 
corollary to the longstanding Japanese industrial policy of administrative guidance.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Those of us who have been assigned to what political economists used to refer to as the 
“revisionist” school of economic thought on Japanese industrial policy (although nowadays, 
largely thanks to the work of Masahiko Aoki and his colleagues, most of us would think of this 
group as mathematically and economically orthodox and the “old school” as having consisted 
largely of historical revisionists) have often been mistakenly criticized for praising MITI and 
MEITI for a policy of trying to “pick” products, technologies or markets which are “winners” or 
“losers”.  These critics then invoke the principles of neoclassical micro-economics to argue that 
such a system can never work and that “the market” is the only efficient mechanism for making 
such determinations and that given efficient markets, random walk theory dictates that their 
behavior cannot be predicted in advance.   
 While this approach has become one which has been increasingly discredited with the 
passage of time, as well as the introduction of computational modeling and the development of 
financial tools based on methods originally derived from the physical sciences, it too is “sticky” 
and tends to cling as an unspoken kind of assumption in both international economics, and 
perhaps more importantly in international business, particularly in areas where strategic planning 
has a longstanding operational or historical tradition.   
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Firgure 2: The Simplified Cost-Focus Matrix 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Michael Porter’s Cost-Focus Matrix 
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player 2 
plan A plan B 
player 1 
plan A 7; 9 0; 1 
plan B 3; 5 4; 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Normal Form Game With Independent Nash Equilibrium 
 
 
Figure 5:  Extensive Form Game with Independent Nash Equilibrium 
 
 
 
Continental Europe 
industrialise don't industrialise 
England 
industrialise 20; 45  60; 10 
don't industrialise 10; 60 0; 0 
 
 
Figure 6:  The Traditional View of Second Mover Advantage 
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Figure 7: The Traditional View of Second Mover Advantage in Extensive Form 
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system A                       system B 
Piccolo 
system A 10; 4  3; 6 
system B 2; 7 9; 5 
 
    
 
 
 
Figure 8:  The Piccolo-Gigantic Payoff Matrix 
 
